What has the Iran conflict done to Strait of Hormuz traffic?

Strait of Hormuz tanker crossings fell 70% during the June 7–July 7 truce window compared with baseline, according to Kpler ship-tracking data cited in a CSIS analysis. The U.S.–Iran memorandum of understanding collapsed in July 2026 when Iran targeted commercial shipping in the waterway, and the U.S. blockade of Iranian ports has resumed.

The numbers matter because Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain have no meaningful export route that bypasses Hormuz. Saudi Arabia diverts crude through its East-West Pipeline to the Red Sea. The UAE loads at Fujairah. Qatar cannot.

CSIS senior associate Leslie Palti-Guzman writes that "Iran may have already played its Hormuz card, and the IRGC's ability to use the strait as a strategic weapon may start to wane."

How much Qatari capacity is offline?

Iran struck two liquefaction trains at the Ras Laffan complex on March 18. Both trains are co-owned by QatarEnergy and ExxonMobil. QatarEnergy has indicated repairs could require three to five years, removing 17% of the country's 64 mtpa of undamaged export capacity.

Qatar's broader expansion to nearly double its 77 mtpa nameplate faces delay. The North Field East project of 33 mtpa could reach operation in 2028. North Field South adds another 16 mtpa. Qatar's energy minister said the North Field expansion could slip more than a year because of the Iranian attacks.

How many Gulf operators have declared force majeure?

More than 25 energy companies operating across the GCC have declared force majeure since the conflict began, according to IISS tracking cited in the CSIS paper. Targets have included LNG facilities, oil export terminals, refineries, pipelines, storage tanks, and power infrastructure across Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, and Oman.

In June, Qatar exported roughly 40 loaded LNG tankers through the strait, equivalent to about 2.8 million tons, per ship-tracking data. Energy Vista estimates Qatar could still ship slightly less than 30 million metric tons this year, contingent on monthly Hormuz access. QatarEnergy has extended LNG force majeure into October.

What scenarios does CSIS outline?

Three paths remain on the table: "no war, no peace" as the base case, a return to full-scale war, and a comprehensive peace agreement.

The base case produces incremental Strait disruptions, with Iran closing transit for hours at a time while Gulf economies absorb persistent damage. The full-scale war scenario could carry $1.13 billion per day in costs at day six, rising to $165 billion by day twelve, per the CSIS estimate. The comprehensive peace track, currently the least likely, would let Iran return to international energy markets as a major oil and gas competitor.

Qatar and Oman have emerged as the most conciliatory toward Iran, Palti-Guzman notes. Doha had indicated a "temporary toll" at the Strait of Hormuz is negotiable if it helps restore passage. Iran, however, rejected an Omani proposal to share responsibility for the waterway, including a voluntary transit-fee mechanism.

Where is global LNG supply heading?

U.S. LNG projects under construction will add more than 120 mtpa of liquefaction capacity over the next five years, more than doubling the country's existing export capacity, according to Energy Vista analysis cited by CSIS. In 2027 alone, approximately 52 mtpa of new U.S. capacity is expected online, including Plaquemines Phase 2, Calcasieu Pass 2, Rio Grande LNG, and Port Arthur LNG.

Canada is on track for roughly 20 mtpa of export capacity by the end of the decade, with potential to rise beyond 45 mtpa if Ksi Lisims LNG and a second phase of LNG Canada proceed.

Qatar's start-up of the Golden Pass LNG project on the U.S. Gulf Coast, owned 70% by QatarEnergy and 30% by ExxonMobil, gives QatarEnergy a 12.6 mtpa merchant share. That volume roughly equals the supply lost from the two damaged Ras Laffan trains, raising questions about whether Doha and Tehran had a quiet understanding on which facilities would be targeted.

What does the standoff mean for buyers?

The Iran war is strengthening the case for OECD suppliers, particularly those in the Western Hemisphere. North America's West Coast combines political stability, direct access to Asian markets, and routes that avoid Hormuz, the Panama Canal, the Suez Canal, and the Malacca Strait.

Multi-energy hedging is now validated. Buyers will diversify not only among suppliers but also among fuels, delivery entry points, shipping access, technologies, and contract structures. U.S. gasoline prices topped $4 per gallon in the week of July 20, ahead of November midterm elections, adding a domestic political constraint on escalation.

The watch items: the IRGC's next move on commercial shipping, QatarEnergy's October force-majeure decision, first-cargo dates for Plaquemines Phase 2 and Rio Grande LNG, and whether Iran's latest one-way traffic proposal through Oman can revive diplomatic channels.