Novatek Funding Claim Triggers Full Executive Exit at Polar LNG

Every senior executive at Polar LNG resigned in September, six months after the startup's March 2026 launch, over alleged funding and strategic control by Russia's largest LNG exporter, privately-held Novatek. The company's Alaska North Slope project, targeting first gas deliveries by end-2030, now faces a sanctions question it cannot answer cleanly.

What did the executives actually allege?

The departing managers say they learned in early September that Novatek was at least partly financing the U.S. company, according to their own accounts to the Financial Times and The Wall Street Journal. Joel Riddle, who resigned as CEO in September, told the FT he discovered Novatek was "calling the shots" and providing capital without approval from the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the agency that administers sanctions.

"I resigned as chief executive of Polar LNG because I felt uncomfortable that the Russian company Novatek was financing and ultimately controlling the strategic direction of the company," Riddle told the FT.

Two other former executives told the Journal that senior staff shared their concerns about Novatek's role with the U.S. Administration in early September, and that government officials expressed concern as well. Note what is not said: no agency has opened a public enforcement action, and Novatek itself is not under U.S. sanctions. Washington did blacklist Novatek's Arctic LNG-2 project in 2023, and that expansion has stalled since. The distinction matters for any legal claim.

What was Polar LNG trying to build?

The startup pitched a North Slope liquefaction project selling into Asia, marketing the location as offering "one of the shortest shipping routes from North America to key Asian markets." Polar LNG also stated it "is not in competition with the proposed Alaska LNG pipeline," arguing the North Slope holds more gas than any single project can develop.

The technical hook is a modular gravity-based structure (GBS) — a seabed-resting concrete platform — to liquefy gas at the source, cutting construction time and cost. Polar LNG has applied to OFAC for a license to buy an unfinished GBS from Novatek. Sources tell the Journal there has been no progress on that license. No authorization has been granted.

That stalled license is the whole ballgame: the project's cost-and-schedule advantage depends on acquiring Russian hardware.

How does the money trail run?

Abu Dhabi-based engineering firm TechWave has provided capital to Polar LNG. Bjorn Gundersen, a former Novatek executive, now works at TechWave, sources with knowledge of the matter told the Journal. The company says TechWave "initiated preliminary engineering work involving U.S. contractors" and that the project "is seeking American investors and implementation partners."

The former executives' account, per Riddle, is that during funding discussions this summer he found Novatek was already financing Polar LNG and directing operations before any U.S. approval existed. That is the core dispute. The takeaway: capital allegedly flowed before permissions, and permissions still have not arrived.

What does Polar LNG say?

The company fired back last week with its own framing. Polar LNG attributed the leadership change to "concerns regarding a disgruntled former employee, Joel Riddle," and said Riddle "was recently terminated from the company for cause." It added it is "investigating claims concerning Riddle that may result in litigation" and declined further comment.

On compliance, the startup stated: "Development activities are being pursued in full compliance with applicable U.S. laws," pointing to its pending OFAC application for the GBS purchase. Riddle says he resigned; the company says it terminated him for cause. Both accounts cannot be true, and nothing in the public record yet resolves them.

Can the 2030 target survive?

Polar LNG's own language is hedged: deliveries "by the end of 2030, subject to securing necessary permits, financing, engineering and other development requirements." Every one of those conditions is now in doubt. The OFAC license has stalled, the executive bench is empty, and the alleged sanctions exposure — the former employees' concern, not an established violation — could derail the project outright.

Watch the OFAC docket. Without a license for the Novatek GBS, Polar LNG has no disclosed liquefaction platform, no sanctioned funding path, and no stated timeline for replacing either.